The Biden administration was thoroughly incompetent. But that’s not the half of it.
Because Wasington, D.C. erupted when this intel on the Biden admin went public for the first time.
In a stunning revelation of missed opportunities during the chaotic 2021 Afghanistan withdrawal, top U.S. military leaders rejected proposals that could have blocked the Taliban from seizing Kabul. General Frank McKenzie, former CENTCOM commander, and Rear Admiral Peter Vasely, then head of U.S. Forces Afghanistan-Forward, turned away offers from both the Taliban and Afghan allies, leading to the disastrous scenes that unfolded at Kabul’s airport.
McKenzie met with Taliban leader Mullah Baradar in Doha, Qatar, in mid-August 2021, a discussion that paved the way for the Taliban to control Kabul while U.S. forces depended on enemy fighters for airport security during the evacuation.
At that meeting, Baradar proposed pulling Taliban forces back from Kabul, allowing American troops to secure the city and handle the evacuation without interference. McKenzie, however, dismissed the idea immediately. Today, McKenzie serves as Executive Director for the Global and National Security Institute at the University of Southern Florida.
Afghan Generals Haibatullah Alizai and Sami Sadat also pushed for martial law after President Ashraf Ghani fled Kabul in mid-August 2021. They sought U.S. backing, but Vasely, now retired, rejected it outright and urged them to abandon the fight and retreat to the airport.
The consequences of these choices remain uncertain, but the deadly chaos in Kabul that followed is etched in American memory. Shockingly, the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s final report ignored McKenzie’s pivotal Doha meeting with the Taliban entirely.
The report barely touched on Alizai and Sadat’s plea for aid, noting only: “Even as the Taliban reached the gates of Kabul, the highest-ranking remaining Afghan commander, General Alizai, asked for U.S. support in a last stand to defend Kabul.”
It omitted details on which U.S. officer received the request, the response given, or any further context. Critics of the report point to its omissions, but a spokesperson for former HFAC Chairman Michael McCaul stated: “Chairman McCaul stands by his comprehensive report, the culmination of 18 transcribed interviews, seven public hearings, and 20,000 pages of documents obtained under subpoena from the State Department.”
In his memoir, The Melting Point, McKenzie disclosed that Zalmay Khalilzad, special representative for Afghan reconciliation, urged him to Doha in early August 2021. On August 5, Khalilzad called and “delivered his bombshell: [Biden national security adviser] Jake Sullivan wanted me to go to Doha to join in negotiations with him and the Taliban. I was noncommittal.”
McKenzie added: “I did not relish being a potted plant for Zal while he continued to negotiate, with his leverage melting away every day, driven by events on the ground.” He suspected Khalilzad, not Sullivan, originated the idea, noting: “I wasn’t sure where the idea had actually come from. I knew Zal and his methods well enough to believe that perhaps he — not Jake — had suggested this. It was then a small step to call me and to infer that the national security advisor wanted me to go. I did not commit to doing anything during our call, since neither Zal nor Jake had the authority to tell me to go.”
After speaking with Khalilzad, McKenzie contacted Joint Chiefs Chairman Mark Milley, who was “completely unaware” of the plan. According to Franklin Foer’s book, The Last Politician, Sullivan later told Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin: “I think you need to send someone with bars on his arm to Doha to talk to the Taliban so that they understand not to mess with an evacuation.” Austin agreed to send McKenzie.
In his memoir, McKenzie recounted that on August 12, Milley informed him Austin wanted him in Doha. The goal was to meet the Taliban on August 15 to warn them off Kabul during the evacuation. By August 13, U.S. Marine units had arrived in Kabul. By McKenzie’s arrival in Doha, the Taliban had surrounded and begun entering Kabul.
McKenzie described Austin’s orders: “was to prepare a map that established a boundary around Kabul on easily identifiable geographic features, at a range of between twenty-five and thirty kilometers from HKIA. It would be a rough circle but would trace against terrain features that could be understood and visualized. My instructions were to tell the Taliban to stay outside this line, which was variously called a no-penetration line or a line of control, until we completed our withdrawal, which would be August 31. In return, we would stop striking them across Afghanistan. We would, however, strike inside the line of control if they interfered with our withdrawal.”
Reports from The New York Times confirm McKenzie warned the Taliban against entering the zone, but they were already inside it. Baradar asked if the U.S. wanted full security control of Kabul, an offer McKenzie rejected. When Baradar inquired about Taliban control, McKenzie, after consulting Khalilzad, said he had “no opinion” as long as the evacuation proceeded unhindered.
This forced U.S. reliance on Taliban security at the airport, with Khalilzad mediating between American commanders and Taliban leaders.
